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War College: Book Reviews

BOOK REVIEWS

WHAT DOES CHINA WANT?
Heath, Timothy. China’s New Governing Party Paradigm: Political Renewal and the Pursuit of National Rejuvenation. Farnham, Surrey, U.K.: Ashgate, 2014. 256pp. $109.95

In 2012, Tim Heath, then an analyst
at U.S. Pacific Command, published a
scholarly article that considered whether
in fact China had a national strategy
(“What Does China Want? Discerning
the PRC’s National Strategy,” Asian Security 8, no. 1 [2012], pp. 54–72). Drawing extensively from Chinese sources,
Heath argued that China did not have
a formal national strategy document
but did outline the essential elements
of a national strategy in the authoritative writings of the Chinese Communist
Party. Among professionals working
Pacific security issues, the article was
widely discussed and well regarded.
In China’s New Governing Party Paradigm, Tim Heath expands and broadens this theme, examining the central
narrative that both provides internal
justification for exclusive Chinese
Communist Party rule and shapes the
policies the party imposes on China.
Along the way, he offers a detailed
description of the mechanisms the
party employs to study, develop, and
communicate the essential decisions
that literally form the “party line.”
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Up until the 1980s, academic studies
of the People’s Republic of China often
focused on ideology, revolution, and
the impact of the Communist Party and
party struggles. In the years since Deng
Xiaoping announced the “reform and
opening up” that freed China’s economic
potential, analysts have focused on the
impact of this economic change and
the social forces it unleashed. In many
cases, these studies portray the party
as having abandoned ideology, offering
the Chinese people national prestige
and economic prosperity in its place.
Heath suggests that party ideology was
not abandoned but transformed to
ensure the party’s continued relevance
and claim to authority. The key change
came in 2002 when an authoritative
official report referred to the Communist Party as the “governing party.”
Though largely unremarked on at
the time, this pronouncement represented a formal abandonment of the
“revolutionary party” ideology that had
justified party rule since the foundation of the People’s Republic in 1949.
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While governments universally claim
that they can govern competently, Heath
underscores the exclusivity of the party’s
claim: not merely that it can rule well,
but that it is uniquely equipped through
rigorous study and discovery of natural
laws to rule well. In Heath’s words, the
party asserts that “no other political
group possesses an intellectual grasp of
the historic natural laws underpinning
China’s development.” The exclusivity of
this claim means that ideology, far from
being dead, is of central importance in
justifying the party’s rule. The party’s
grasp is expressed in correct theory
that, promulgated by the party, becomes
the basis for central directives that
then are expressed in laws and policy.
Party theory is broad and elastic, setting a central direction and allowing
increasingly professional bureaucracies to develop more-detailed guidance
that aligns with the party line. The shift
to a “governing party paradigm” has
caused the party to focus on formalizing,
regularizing, and bounding this process
of policy interpretation. This interpretation process allows ministries and lower
levels of government some genuine
latitude in decision making within the
overall guidance. This is, however, “rule
of law” in the Chinese rather than Western sense. The absolute demand that
law conform to party guidance renders
any move toward independent authority, either bureaucratic or democratic, a
threat to party rule, and transgressions
of party guidance are quickly suppressed via an enforcement process that,
to Western eyes, appears extralegal.
Much of the book describes the bureaucratic structure that develops,
reviews, and issues party guidance.
Heath emphasizes the key role of the
Central Party School in this process.
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The two most recent general secretaries of the Communist Party, Hu Jintao
and Xi Jinping, previously served as
Central Party School presidents. They
have relied on the school, its staff, and its
students as both a think tank and a key
means of promulgating their guidance.
For readers interested in national security, Heath’s analysis raises a number
of essential issues. The party’s claim to
unique competency means that its legitimacy is in large part performance based.
While the concept of “performance
legitimacy” in the Chinese system is not
new, Heath underscores how critical it
is that the party be able to present itself
as successful, or at least competent, in
every key policy area. In this context, it
is clear why Xi Jinping views endemic
corruption as a key threat to party rule.
Further, Heath’s analysis has important implications for the future of the
Chinese military. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has a unique relationship with the party. It is, of course, the
party’s army, first and last accountable
to the party leadership. It too, however,
has been impacted by the tendency to
delegate execution-level detail to professional bureaucracies. Heath’s model
suggests that PLA leaders, as technical
experts in their field, will expect to enjoy
increasing influence and autonomy
within their area of expertise. The party,
however, is especially sensitive to its
control of the military, and the tension
in this relationship that Heath identifies
will likely continue in coming years.
This is a dense, specialized book, and
the generalist would do well to start
with a work such as Richard McGregor’s excellent The Party: The Secret
World of China’s Communist Rulers
(2012) as an introduction to the topic.
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However, the work is approachable
to the motivated reader and for the
Navy’s growing cadre of Asia-Pacific
hands represents essential reading.
DALE C. RIELAGE

Serrat, Austin, Lawrence Douglas, and Martha
Merrill Umphrey, eds. Law and War. Stanford,
Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2014. 248pp. $75

Law and War is a collection of five essays
on the role of law in war offered as part
of the Amherst Series in Law, Jurisprudence, and Social Thought. What ties the
essays together is their shared interest in
“interrogating the assumption . . . that
the insertion of law into war is necessarily a salutary achievement.” But this connection is often loose, and, while several
of the essays have a great deal of individual merit, it is perhaps a weakness
of the book that it lacks the degree of
overall coherence that one might expect.
Sarah Sewell leads off with the essay
most relevant to military legal practitioners and warfighters. In “Limits of
Law: Promoting Humanity in Armed
Conflict,” Sewell makes a compelling
argument that modern norms about
what is acceptable in war often outstrip
the limits imposed by the actual law;
that is, norms often make “unacceptable”
conduct that the law inarguably still
permits. She views this as a negative development, fearing that as gaps develop
between the norms and the law, it will
increasingly erode respect for the latter.
By way of example, Sewell highlights
the growing normative expectation that
powerful states will eliminate civilian
casualties in war, while the law of armed
conflict has always recognized an uneasy
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balance between humanitarian protection and military necessity—a balance
that “the norm of minimizing civilian
casualties” does not need to maintain.
Gabriella Blum follows Sewell, and in
“The Individualization of War” she
explains how such norms have taken
hold through a process she describes
as a shift from “collectivism” to “cosmopolitanism,” by which she means
a shift from a “state-centered set of
obligations” to one focusing on the
rights of individuals to be protected
from the evils of war. Like Sewell, Blum
asserts that this development is not
necessarily good, leading to an increasing conflation between the norms of
policing and those of warfighting (with
negative consequences to both).
The third essay represents a substantive, if not thematic, departure, as Laura
Donohue writes on “Pandemic Disease,
Biological Weapons, and War.” Donohue offers a historical treatment of U.S.
federal authority for responding to such
threats, and argues that post-9/11 fears
have led to a paradigm shift in thinking about them—from public health
menace to national security threat.
This essay is probably most relevant
to military practitioners dealing with
domestic support to civil authorities.
Samuel Moyn’s essay “From Antiwar
Politics to Antitorture Politics” offers
a fascinating comparison between the
legal arguments offered against the
Vietnam War and those often presented
regarding America’s conduct of its
post-9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Through a careful examination of the
role of law in the antiwar movement of
the 1960s and 1970s, Moyn highlights
the extent to which the debate centered
on the legality of America’s entry into
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the conflict, as opposed to focusing
on how America fought. Moyn then
traces a shift toward the end of the war,
particularly Telford Taylor’s trenchant
criticism of American warfighting
practices, which Taylor came to view
as unlawful. By contrast, Moyn argues
that criticism of our modern conflicts is
directed at the conduct of hostilities—
torture, rules of engagement, and war
crimes. He ascribes this to the end of
conscription and the relative inoculation
of much of the American public from
the effects of our wars abroad, but also
to a larger shift in the broad discourse
about the law of war in the modern era,
in which the means and methods of
warfare are much more tightly regulated.
The final essay builds to some extent on
Moyn’s work, though Larry May’s “War
Crimes Trials during and after War” is
less cogent and ultimately less valuable. May sets out to examine whether
war crimes trials are best prosecuted
while hostilities are still under way or
after hostilities are concluded. Controversially, May argues that war crimes
trials during hostilities ought to address
jus ad bellum matters: once a tribunal
finds that unlawful “aggressive war” is
being waged, soldiers of that side are
on notice that they may be participants
in the war crime of aggression. This
strikes the reviewer as highly implausible, and for that reason this essay
is perhaps the weakest of the five.
Ultimately, Law and War is a collection of essays that are largely conceptual and highly normative in their
arguments. As such it is undoubtedly
a thought-provoking and challenging
book, but also one that is not likely to
be of immediate use to military lawyers
per se. On the other hand, for nonlawyers who ponder the role of law in
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war, in policy making, and in shaping and reflecting societal norms, the
book offers many valuable insights.
JOHN MERRIAM

Daddis, Gregory. Westmoreland’s War: Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam. Oxford, U.K.:
Oxford Univ. Press, 2015. 320pp. $36.95

General William Westmoreland, the
American commander of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV)
from 1964 through 1968, remains one of
the most contentious personalities of the
Vietnam War, still the subject of intense
debate among veterans and historians
of the war. Prevalent still is the view
that “Westy” could not see the forest for
the trees, or vice versa, and disastrously
lacked strategic vision and operational
creativity owing to his parochial focus
on employing Cold War “big unit”
doctrine and attrition to combat an
insurgent war of unification. The most
extreme of such assessments of West
moreland comes from Lewis Sorley, who
in multiple works, notably Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam
(Houghton Mifflin, 2011), all but charges
Westmoreland with gross negligence.
Gregory Daddis, formerly of the Military
History Department at West Point and
now associate professor of history at
Chapman University, offers what he
believes is a more balanced view of this
controversial general. In Westmoreland’s War, Daddis argues that instead
of lacking understanding of the conflict in Vietnam and warmly wrapping
himself in the comfort of familiar “big
unit” doctrine, Westmoreland embraced counterinsurgency approaches
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and pacification, strongly supported
building up the Army of the Republic
of Vietnam (ARVN), and recognized
the importance of establishing the
political legitimacy of the government
of the Republic of Vietnam among the
South Vietnamese people. Far from
the bumbling, career-climbing martinet characterized by Sorley, Daddis’s
Westmoreland at least asserted an intellectual understanding of the challenges
of revolutionary warfare. Daddis argues
that Westmoreland recognized the need
for pacification and other counterinsurgency measures, but failed to articulate
his strategy publicly or to his commanders in the field, ending up conducting
what was in essence an unwinnable war.
Daddis offers a challenging corrective on
Westmoreland, but some will find that
his ideas fall a bit short. What West
moreland said and wrote, which Daddis
ably reveals through his extensive and
valuable archival research, does not connect to what happened on the battlefield.
Westmoreland could not militarily rectify the political problems of South Vietnam, and, as both the military and political situations continued to deteriorate,
Westmoreland in turn relied more on
big-unit search and destroy operations
and the massive firepower the American
military had at its disposal. The military
situation, arguably, dictated that Westmoreland use his limited resources—yes,
limited resources—to stem the tide
on the military side at the expense of
manpower and resources for pacification
and other nonkinetic programs. Attrition, whether Westmoreland intended
it or not (Daddis argues not), was the
public face of his strategic and operational approach throughout his tenure
as commander of MACV. If that was
indeed the case, then Westmoreland’s
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failure is in part one of miscommunicating what it was he believed he was doing
in South Vietnam, if not disconnecting
that belief through intent or ignorance
from the military reality his forces
faced, especially from 1966 forward.
Vietnam was not Westmoreland’s war.
Yes, Westmoreland has been and probably will continue to be the face of that
conflict. He is, after all, an easy if not
agreeable target on which to place a
great deal of blame for the American
debacle. However, as Daddis correctly
points out, the Johnson administration,
not Westmoreland, placed limitations on
what Westmoreland could do in Vietnam. Political leaders in Washington,
like the military leader Westmoreland,
eagerly accepted the primacy of American firepower as a military solution to
both military and political problems in
South Vietnam. Still, one must accept
that the officials of the Johnson administration grounded those limitations in
deep political earth. At the time, they
believed they had good reasons for approaching the conflict the way they did.
Ultimately, as Daddis suggests, it did not
matter what those in Washington, Saigon, or MACV did. The war in Vietnam
was a bad war that American leadership
believed had to be fought nonetheless,
resulting in defeat and tragedy that still
haunts the United States fifty years later.
Westmoreland’s War is an important
book. Scholars of the conflict should
read it. Daddis offers thought-provoking
arguments that counter the Sorley
school on the Westmoreland years of
American involvement in Vietnam.
Whether one agrees with Daddis (or
Sorley for that matter), diligent scholars
must consider Daddis’s point of view
and his interpretation of the archival
evidence. Daddis has made a valuable
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contribution to the discussion, just
as he did with his similarly provocative No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S.
Army Effectiveness and Progress in the
Vietnam War (Oxford, 2011). As for
Westmoreland, the debate continues.
WILLIAM THOMAS ALLISON

Hill, Christopher. Outpost: Life on the Frontlines
of American Diplomacy. New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2014. 448pp. $30

An American diplomat for over three
decades, Christopher Hill’s service
took him all over the globe and into
some of the most challenging circumstances faced by a member of
the Foreign Service. This account of
his unique postings during that dynamic time frame is a vivid reminder
of how much the world has changed.
In his memoir, Outpost: Life on the
Frontlines of American Diplomacy, Hill,
now a dean at the Josef Korbel School of
International Studies at the University
of Denver, traces his rise in the Department of State in a style that is engaging
and lively. His writing is honest and
reflective as he recounts his interactions
with some of the most distinguished
and most notorious individuals to grace
the world stage. Over the course of his
fast-paced narrative, he doesn’t pull any
punches in his assessments of people or
policy decisions and, most importantly,
he shares valuable and candid insights
(both successes and failures) and lessons
learned over his distinguished career.
Prior to his start in the State Department, Hill spent two years in the Peace
Corps. He recalls trying to influence a
local credit union election in Cameroon
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and failing miserably. He learned the
folly of trying to change the behavior
of an entire community. He writes,
“Years later, in the Middle East, in the
Balkans, in Asia, I would see time and
time again systemized efforts on the part
of the United States to pick winners in
situations we understood little about.
Like my efforts at the Tole Tea Estate’s
credit union, they never worked.”
Another key theme that emerges is the
importance of mentoring and how it
enabled Hill to reach his full potential
in the State Department. His early assignments under Lawrence Eagleburger
(later Secretary of State under George H.
W. Bush) in Yugoslavia and Richard Holbrooke (lead negotiator at the Dayton
Peace Accords and later ambassador
to the UN) at the European Bureau
exposed him to two of the best practitioners of statecraft in the U.S. government.
After recounting the great success at
Dayton, Hill transitions his narrative
to the latter part of his career, in which
his record as a Foreign Service officer
is a little more mixed. He describes
the numerous actors, both domestic (politicians and members of the
military) and international, that he
encountered during some of his most
demanding billets. These postings,
as the Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, envoy
to the North Korean nuclear talks for
the Bush administration, and the U.S.
ambassador to Iraq for the Obama
administration, seem to have left Hill
unfulfilled and somewhat frustrated.
He takes both administrations to task
for what he believes was an unhealthy
blend of partisan politics and lack of a
long-term policy vision. Of particular
note is Hill’s withering critique of Vice
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President Cheney and his influence in
the Bush administration during the Six
Party Talks. “The neoconservatives,
aided by a vice president’s office deep
with suspicions of the Foreign Service,
seem to believe that the State Department negotiated with the North Koreans
because we enjoyed it. Our effort to explain . . . fell on deaf ears.” Despite Hill’s
best efforts, the North Koreans decided
not to comply with American demands,
and he was soon brought back home.
After a short respite, Hill was selected
to replace Ambassador Ryan Crocker
in Iraq. He makes many valuable
observations about his tour in Iraq,
especially his strained relations with
the U.S. military leadership responsible
for the region, in particular Generals
David Petraeus and Ray Odierno. His
criticism is also directed at the Obama
administration, which he perceived as
slow “to grasp the complexities of the
region, the seeming confusion within
its foreign policy team between wars
of democracy and sectarian enmity.”
Outpost: Life on the Frontlines of American Diplomacy is a significant contribution to the international studies field and
is a must-read. This volume will appeal
to anyone who is interested in learning
more about the Department of State or
the intricacies of American interagency
relationships. However, with all the
security challenges facing the United
States in the foreseeable future, this
book also needs to be read by midgrade
and senior military professionals so
they may gain a better appreciation of
the Foreign Service and the people who
serve in that important institution.
T. J. JOHNSON
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Friedberg, Aaron L. Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The
Debate over US Military Strategy in Asia. London:
Routledge, 2014. 152pp. $14.99

Normally, a recommendation regarding
for which audience a book is best suited
comes at the end of the review. In this
case, it comes first because Professor
Aaron Friedberg provides a tight monograph that illuminates areas of great
misunderstanding to a large population
in the policy and defense communities:
the debate over the concept of Air-Sea
Battle (ASB) and the vernacular of modern maritime strategy. Landlubbers who
have been engrossed for the last fourteen
years in land wars in South Asia should
read this book. As a history professor teaching a population composed
predominantly of U.S. Army majors
at the Command and General Staff
College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
this reviewer has firsthand experience
of this shortfall in knowledge in both
uniformed and civilian defense personnel. The book is also recommended
to all those who desire a comprehensive discussion of the concept and its
variations, alternatives, and origins.
Friedberg, a professor of politics and
international relations at Prince
ton University, made a compelling
case in a January 2015 Washington
Quarterly article about the People’s
Republic of China’s (PRC’s) “new assertiveness,” which, he argues in this
book, is the primary motivator for the
emergence of ASB. From this and his
other writings, he clearly believes that a
response to this assertiveness is absolutely necessary, if not overdue, and in
need of high-profile public debate.
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The monograph is organized into an introduction, four thematic chapters, and
a concluding chapter, all in about 150
pages of nicely spaced text—making it a
comparatively short read, although not a
simple one. Friedberg first lays out how
ASB came to be and how the concept is
defined. Like everyone else, he traces the
origins of ASB to the challenge presented by the PRC’s adoption of a maritime
strategy that includes antiaccess/areadenial (A2/AD), although when ASB
emerged it was generically framed and
could have referred to other countries, including Iran (see for example
this reviewer’s “Air-Sea Battle and
Its Discontents,” USNI Proceedings,
October 2013). A2/AD involved the
expansion of the capabilities of the
People’s Liberation Army Navy after
the Taiwan crisis of 1996 to deny use
of the maritime commons inside the
so-called first island chain and to challenge approaches to that area (p. 26).
Geographically, the first island chain
extends from the Japanese archipelago,
through Taiwan and the Philippines, to
the exit of the South China Sea (SCS)
at the Malacca Strait near Singapore.
China began increasing its surface
and subsurface fleets and its ability to
project air power from land bases into
this region, as well as using innovative
new weapons such as antiship ballistic
missiles to threaten U.S. high-value
units such as aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, and logistics vessels
beyond the first island chain. Additionally, as A2/AD developed it came to
represent a “credible threat,” according to Friedberg, to the naval and air
bases and logistics support by U.S. allies
along the first island chain (pp. 27–28).
Friedberg describes this all in detail
in the introduction and first chapter.
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His second chapter then argues that
the United States responded belatedly to A2/AD because of the terrorist
attacks of 9/11 and the 2008 financial
crisis and great recession. The former
distracted U.S. policy makers from the
emerging threat, and the latter prevented a strong response, because of
the perceived costs in a dismal fiscal
environment. Evidently he believes the
current fiscal environment has eased
enough to take the challenge more
seriously. Here Friedberg could have
supported his argument by emphasizing that, in addition to the economic
crisis at home, the two wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan were consuming inordinate
U.S. resources in 2008. Nonetheless, he
does a credible job of debunking those
critics of ASB who say the A2/AD threat
is overstated or that the relationship
between the United States and China has
improved enough to obviate a response.
Friedberg then outlines in chapter 3
what can be called the classical ASB concept, calling it the “direct approach.” This
approach is primarily offensive, although
it does not posit a U.S. “first strike” but
rather a reactive counteroffensive that
threatens the PRC’s land-based power
projection and naval support to A2/AD
with commensurate U.S. naval and air
power, preferably in concert with allies
such as Japan. He addresses critics by
examining ASB’s efficacy in the following areas (using speculative analysis
in some cases): military outcomes,
political outcomes, escalation (including
nuclear), deterrence value, reassurance
to allies, and the effects on competition
between the United States and the PRC.
Friedberg’s inclusion of nuclear escalatory calculus is a welcome component,
given how little this topic seems to
be factored into policy discussions in
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the multipolar nuclear world we now
inhabit. The Department of Defense
has an Air-Sea Battle Office, as does
the U.S. Navy, and his discussion at the
end of chapter 3 is aimed, presumably,
at the folks inhabiting those organizations and their strategic masters.
Friedberg forecasts two potential ASB
approaches: a “linear” approach that
uses existing resources and technology and, in contrast, a “discontinuous”
approach that relies heavily on new
technologies and un-fielded weapons
concepts (pp. 95–98). Friedberg seems
to prefer the linear approach, given the
ease with which it can be implemented
(although that ease does not mean it
will be inexpensive), but he does not
rule out investigating new technologies. He is obviously wary of “betting
the farm” on a “futures” approach.
In his final chapter, Friedberg describes
two indirect approaches or “alternatives”
to ASB: either a distant blockade or
what he calls “maritime denial” (pp. 104,
116–17). He again applies an analytic
framework to assess the efficacy of these
less-offensive-oriented approaches. Distant blockade is merely economic warfare. It would aim at Chinese shipping,
principally oil tankers at the key straits’
entrances leading through the SCS to
Chinese ports. Maritime denial is simply
ASB limited primarily to the global commons and PRC littoral inside the first island chain. One might characterize maritime denial as an active defense of the
global commons, but again it is reactive,
not something to implement without
significant Chinese military provocation.
The conclusion reviews the bidding on
everything discussed. Here Friedberg
comes across as a bit more bellicose than
one might expect, implying that a mix
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of all three approaches—ASB, distant
blockade, and maritime denial—would
probably be the best course of action.
Friedberg comes closest to the nub of
the issue when he writes: “The first
dividing line in the debate over this issue
is between the advocates of maritime
denial, who seek to avoid strikes against
targets on the Chinese mainland, and
the proponents of ASB, who believe
that war cannot be won without such
attacks” (p. 137). However, he leaves
the door open for the reader to make
up his or her own mind on the issue.
While this might be perceived as
strength, it is also something of a disappointment, because this reviewer wanted
to know what Friedberg really recommends. Friedberg is clearly not of the
opinion that ASB should be dismissed,
and seems to support a course of action
that implies the direct approach option
while being ready, at a moment’s notice,
to implement the other two approaches
in response to a PRC “first strike” (p. 37).
Friedberg leverages all the latest writing
on the topic, using the work of writers familiar to naval audiences such as
Jan van Tol and Wayne Hughes. He has
done his homework, and now it is time
for all others to do theirs as the United
States faces the A2/AD challenge.
JOHN T. KUEHN

Preble, Christopher, and John Mueller, eds. A
Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security. Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute,
2014. 224pp. $12.95

Medical doctors are trained to recognize when patients’ complaints and
self-diagnoses need to be ignored, lest
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the doctor be responsible for unnecessary medical treatment. It is unfortunate
that we do not have similar education
for national security officials regarding
threats to the nation. With such training, there is a chance we could avoid
at least some of the overreactions to
misperceived threats that have burdened recent American foreign policy.
There is a significant and growing
literature addressing the issue of threat
inflation, and Christopher A. Preble and
John Mueller’s edited volume A Dangerous World? is an important contribution in this area. Published by the Cato
Institute, it is a collection of sixteen
essays by an array of authors, each
delving into a different aspect of the
U.S. threat environment. Their aim is to
question the assumptions that underpin
so much of U.S. national security policy:
that we live in a perilous world riven
by uncertainty and threats, and only a
robust, expensive, and active defense
preserves the homeland’s security.
To this end, the work addresses a wide
range of topics, each examined by a
different contributor. Francis Gavin
and John Mueller separately examine
America’s history of nuclear alarmism,
noting that predictions of imminent
explosions in a number of nuclear weapons states have been commonplace for
decades. Lyle Goldstein argues convincingly that the threat China poses to the
United States is a limited one (he uses
the memorable phrase “panda claws”)
and he claims China’s rise can be countered with low-cost strategies. (As of this
writing, recent devaluations of the yuan
raise the possibility of a future Chinese
retrenchment, further reducing the need
for a potent American counter.) Former
U.S. intelligence officer Paul Pillar
explores substate threats (including
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terror groups), asserting that America is
too quick to seize on new threats. Since
9/11, more Americans have drowned
in their bathtubs than have been killed
in the United States by terrorist attacks,
and improved security cannot account
for the entirety of this disparity.
Michael Cohen asks whether other
aspects of personal welfare, such as
health security, should also be addressed in our discussions of security.
Daniel Drezner explores the economic
benefits of American military preeminence, and finds them elusive. The
United States has spent trillions on
homeland defense and overseas confrontations since 9/11, Drezner notes,
while the total economic impact of
9/11 itself was “only” $100 billion.
Elsewhere, Christopher Fettweis examines the pervasive anxiety in American
national security culture, arguing that
“geopolitical fear” has become something of an American tradition, passed
on from generation to generation.
“Wealth creates insecurity in individuals, and it seems to do so in states as
well.” Benjamin Friedman explores the
issue of threat inflation, arguing that
America’s vast power “distributes the
costs” and “concentrates the benefits”
of confrontational policies, creating
constituencies that promote (and even
become dependent on) maintaining a state of unnecessary vigilance.
In many respects, America can afford
to exaggerate the world’s perils. There
is no meaningful political pressure to
reduce the budget of the Department
of Defense, and America’s national
security expenditures, large though
they are, constitute only a fraction of
the federal budget. At the same time,
one must also consider the risk that
threat inflation poses to American
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lives. More Americans were killed as a
consequence of the decision to invade
Iraq in 2003 than on 9/11 itself. But
there is also the long-term causal impact
of the U.S. invasion. The existence
of ISIS is another unintended consequence of the American invasion.
It is true that there are dangers in this
world. But Preble and Mueller’s volume
constitutes an antidote to America’s
tendency to imagine grave peril, and
serves as an important counter to the
American proclivity to overstate the
benefits and understate the costs of an
assertive global military posture. The
editors argue that America is largely
free of threats that require military
preparedness or balancing behavior.
In his chapter, Fettweis argues that
America’s tendency to exaggerate the
world’s dangers can be altered, since it is
based on a system of beliefs that can be
changed over time. Let’s hope he’s right.
ANDREW STIGLER

Hassan, Hassan, and Michael Weiss. ISIS: Inside
the Army of Terror. New York: Regan Arts, 2015.
288pp. $16.95

The surprising success of the Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in seizing control of large parts of northern
and western Iraq in 2014 has generated many questions for policy makers
and the public. How was this group so
effective so quickly? Where did it come
from and how did so many observers miss its rise? What threat does
ISIS pose to the region and beyond?
Hassan Hassan and Michael Weiss address these questions in this recent book
about ISIS. The work is part history of
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the ISIS movement and part analysis
of its nature and strategy. The authors’
backgrounds—Weiss is a prolific
journalist and Hassan a knowledgeable
Syrian analyst at the Delma Institute
in Abu Dhabi—combine brilliantly to
explain the rapidly evolving events on
the ground within the context of the
political-military issues in the region.
Hassan and Weiss interviewed current
and former ISIS movement fighters in
Syria, dissected ISIS propaganda videos
and statements, and combined other
scholarly analyses of ISIS to produce
what I consider to be the most accurate
assessment of ISIS currently available.
The overwhelming strength of the book
is that Hassan and Weiss get the history
of ISIS right. Although it is often mistakenly thought of as a recent phenomenon,
the authors correctly trace the group’s
evolution as a core of Salafist-oriented
fighters who joined together under Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq in 2002–2003.
Zarqawi’s unique outlook, based in the
same Salafi-jihadist school as Osama
Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda, imprinted on
the ISIS movement early and has been
the biggest factor in the popularization of its distinct ideology and the
evolution of its tactics and strategy. The
authors capture this dynamic, as well as
ISIS’s subsequent transformation from
a foreign fighter–based organization
to a more indigenous Iraqi-led group
that eventually split with Al Qaeda.
Because of their understanding of ISIS
history, Hassan and Weiss are able to
demonstrate the ideological foundation
behind ISIS’s strategic targeting and why
the group takes on such a large spectrum
of enemies at once. The authors are also
able to explain ISIS’s genocidal strategy
and how the group promotes its own
atrocities to inspire fear in its enemies.
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This book illuminates the strategic debate over the importance of uncontrolled
spaces to groups like ISIS. ISIS’s effective use of low levels of indiscriminate
violence to take over large parts of Syria
and Iraq since 2013 demonstrates the
opportunity that ungoverned space affords malignant actors such as ISIS. The
ISIS movement began in the Kurdish areas of Iraq outside the reach of Saddam
Hussein in 2002, and moved quickly
into Anbar after identifying a security
vacuum following the invasion of Iraq in
2003. The collapse of the Assad government in eastern Syria and the defeat of
the Sunni Awakening militias and their
Iraqi security partners in several Iraqi
provinces (2008–12) once again created
space for the ISIS movement—this time
to recover from its 2007 defeat in Iraq.
Despite today’s blistering air campaign,
ISIS maintains control over most of
the Sunni areas of Iraq and Syria, and
arguably continues to develop deep
roots of support among the population.
The authors also highlight the problems
of both the Bush and Obama administrations’ war-termination strategies for
Iraq, in what has become a recognized
weakness in the American way of war.
Comfortable with outsourcing security
in Sunni areas to an untrained civilian
militia, both the Iraqis and Americans
turned a blind eye to the fact that ISIS
would make the Sunni Awakening an
important target in order to reestablish
core sanctuaries inside Iraq. The authors
point with amazement to the gradual
release of hard-core ISIS prisoners
(2008–11) back into their communities as one of several factors that helped
fuel the growth of ISIS from its post
surge nadir. While the reasons for this
shortsighted approach were undoubtedly political and legal in nature, these
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policies surely have contributed to the
untimely deaths of thousands of Iraqis
and the loss of much territory to ISIS.
As of 2015, nineteen of twenty of ISIS’s
top leaders were formerly in American
custody at Camp Bucca before being
released or escaping from custody.
Overall, I highly recommend this
book to policy makers, educators,
and military professionals who seek
a deeper understanding of the ISIS
movement. The authors have provided
a very believable representation of a
contemporary group that I believe will
be vindicated by additional research in
the future. Until that time, this book
will become the basis for most of our
understanding of a highly secretive
and effective pseudostate that remains
a threat to the region and beyond.
CRAIG WHITESIDE

Muth, Jörg. Command Culture: Officer Education
in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces,
1901–1940, and the Consequences for World War
II. Denton: Univ. of North Texas Press, 2013.
376pp. $29.95

Dr. Jörg Muth has written a serious
comparative account of the German
and American precommissioning
courses and general staff colleges from
1901 to 1940. Any new work comparing German and American military
effectiveness in the first half of the
twentieth century is guaranteed to
be controversial, and Muth certainly
achieves controversy. However, there
exists a significant revisionist school
of thought that offers an interpretation much different from Muth’s.
The May 2010 Society of Military History annual meeting, held at the Virginia
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Military Institute, featured a very wellattended roundtable that posed the
question of American or German operational or tactical superiority. The panel
moderator first asked how many of the
historians in the room had spent their
teenage years reading books promoting the vaunted Prussian and German
militaries. Nearly every hand went up.
Attracted by the works of Heinz Guderian, F. W. von Mellenthin, Liddell Hart,
J. F. C. Fuller, and others, many of these
teenagers grew up to be believers in the
conventional wisdom that the Germans
got it pretty well right. A complementary opinion was that the American
military forces got very little right. In
1986, Heller and Stofft’s America’s First
Battles became the standard history for
those who found in the German army
the bravery, intelligence, and aggressive
leadership they sought for America.
Muth and this reviewer were both in the
audience for the 2010 roundtable, and
both of our hands went up. However,
the revisionist school, with Michael
Doubler’s Closing with the Enemy (1994),
Keith Bonn’s When the Odds Were Even
(1994), and Peter Mansoor’s GI Offensive in Europe (1999) in the vanguard, is
alive and well. Perhaps the most useful
direct discussion of this historiographic
misalignment was Brian Linn’s piece in
the Journal of Military History (April
2002) “The American Way of War Revisited” and the comments in response
by Russell Weigley. Linn’s article and
Weigley’s response effectively frame the
distinct difference between interpretations that hold that the German armed
forces in both World War I and World
War II either were superior to the armed
forces of the United States or were not.
Muth has significant challenges using primary and secondary sources.
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He seems to relish his biases, and even
partly explains those biases in the “Author’s Afterword,” which Muth states was
added upon the sage advice of Edward
M. Coffman and Dennis Showalter.
Muth’s characterization of U.S. Army
officers—as people from whom he
should hide as a youth hanging out with
American soldiers on maneuvers—may be
more self-revelatory than Muth realizes.
Muth arguably tries to do too much
in a single book. His interpretation of
officer education in both Germany and
the United States focuses on two levels:
cadets in their precommissioning programs and field-grade officers attending
the equivalent of a general staff college.
Unfortunately, Muth does little beyond
making assertions unsupported by
evidence. These assertions are frequently
that American army officer education
was bad, and that the equivalent in Germany was good. He absolutely fails to
place either education system in its historical context, going so far as to say that
the word Prussia would be needlessly
complicating, and that he therefore only
uses Germany. Muth claims that “school
solutions” at Leavenworth were “always
the norm” and that “ineffective courses
were led by instructors who sometimes
lacked knowledge of their fields and
usually failed in didactics and pedagogics.” The only footnote to this paragraph
refers the reader to Craig Mullaney’s
Unforgiving Minute about junior officers
and tactical combat in Afghanistan. No
other source is cited, except for a vague
reference to a 2000 West Point graduate.
This is not an isolated case. There
are multiple unsubstantiated claims
throughout the book. For two more
examples, Muth says nothing of the
poor reputation of the XI Corps of the
Army of the Potomac when he asserts
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that German immigrants made for
highly respected soldiers in the American Civil War. He also misses the First
and Second Schleswig-Holstein Wars of
1848–51 and 1864, respectively, when
he asserts that in 1866 Prussia had not
been at war for nearly fifty years.
Despite these significant shortcomings, this reviewer hopes that Muth
continues to contribute to both the
conversation and the controversy.
PETER J. SCHIFFERLE

Philbin, Tobias R. Battle of Dogger Bank: The First
Dreadnought Engagement. Bloomington: Indiana
Univ. Press, 2014. 198pp. $32

This title is the latest work from American naval historian Tobias Philbin, who
is probably best known for his 1982
biography of Admiral von Hipper. In the
author’s words, the book is “designed to
provide new insights into the first battle
between the largest fighting machines
of the early twentieth century.” As such,
one might expect that a detailed analysis
of the conduct of the battle itself would
form the heart of the work, with perhaps
a supporting explanation of the tactics
employed on both sides and a discussion of whether these were or were not
in line with prewar expectations. This
could have been further supported by
brief chapters explaining the strategic
situation in the naval war at that point;
the role of the key personalities; and the
original thinking behind the development of the “fast Dreadnought cruiser”
as a warship type, insofar as it might
help explain the platform’s performance
in the battle itself. The work could then
have been concluded with a discussion
on the lessons learned and whether the
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proposed corrective measures were successful. In other words, the focus should
have been clearly on the engagement
itself and what it vindicated or didn’t.
Sadly, however, and despite good intentions, Philbin falls well short of this aim.
His coverage of the actual battle is scanty
and disjointed, and the remainder of
the work is notably deficient or simply
inaccurate. This is doubly frustrating
given that this battle, the first of only
two dreadnought-versus-dreadnought
engagements in the entire war, probably
represented each side’s “last, best chance”
to put things right, so to speak, before
the better-known battle of Jutland a year
later. As such, it is indeed an important
area for study by the naval historian.
Philbin’s difficulties are threefold. First,
and as intimated, the balance is arguably
wrong between the coverage of the battle
itself and the supporting text. He devotes
only 30 of the 150 or so pages to actual
analysis of the battle, with the remaining
pages dealing with the supporting areas.
Unfortunately, these 30 pages, more than
many others, fall victim to the second
difficulty he has, which is in developing
a clear and coherent narrative of a series
of events, free from repetition and diversion. Rather than recounting the main
features of the engagement in a chronological fashion, he chooses to take the
different perspectives of the individual
ships involved, which does not help the
reader elucidate the decision making as
it might have appeared to the opposing fleet commanders at the time—a
feature central to his stated aim—and
leads to a nonsequential presentation of
the main events. None of this is helped
by the maps in the book that, although
reproductions of the original battle
reports and histories, are almost unreadable in the scale presented. Thus, despite
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being fairly familiar with the overall
engagement, I found myself resorting to Wikipedia for a quick reminder
and sanity check. Repetition is also rife
throughout the book, sometimes in
successive paragraphs, pages, and even
endnotes, which makes the reader’s
journey more laborious than it need be.
The real worry, though, is his third
difficulty: that of accuracy and the
incorporation of a comprehensive coverage of the relevant scholarship. On the
accuracy side, some of the construction
dates for the ships involved are incorrect, even according to the sources that
he does use; he cites the wrong Lambert
in the text on page 6; on page 24, he
claims Dogger was the first “battle” in
the Anglo-German naval race when it
was, of course, the first dreadnought
engagement; while on page 27 he has
HMS Vernon as “the gunnery school for
the Royal Navy,” when it was actually
HMS Excellent. To make matters worse
in the context, Admiral John “Jacky”
Fisher was of course closely associated
with both of these establishments, albeit
at different points in his career. In addition, and while not as specific, there are
all sorts of other, more general omissions and inaccuracies in the presentation of the powder vulnerabilities, the
ammunition and gunnery practices in
use, and the train of thought that led to
the all-big-gun ordnance, all of which
could have been corrected by reference
to some of the more current scholarship from the likes of Jon Sumida, John
Brooks, and Norman Friedman. Perhaps
most importantly, though, and given
that the author attempted to cover the
origins of the battle cruiser type in his
second chapter, it was disappointing to
find Admiral Fisher’s role in the whole
debate minimized, and the relationship
between the true dreadnought and its
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battle cruiser variant simplified to an
unrealistic degree. This is no trivial matter, because, to a greater or lesser extent,
the fact that the battle cruiser was essentially performing in a role that had not
been originally envisioned by its creators
goes a long way toward explaining the
very mixed results these ships achieved.
Once again, this could have been better
represented with a more searching inclusion of some of the more cutting-edge
findings from Sumida, Nicolas Lambert, Matthew Seligmann, and others.
In sum, this book will probably disappoint the serious historian of the
period. It does gather together in one
place a host of interesting and related
facts about the battle and its participants. Given that these can form
useful “points of departure” for future
work in this area, as well as informing and inspiring the amateur naval
enthusiast, all is not lost. But the book
could have been so much more.
ANGUS ROSS

Huang, Chun-chieh. Taiwan in Transformation:
Retrospect and Prospect. 2nd ed. New Brunswick,
N.J.: Transaction, 2014. 233pp. $52.95

As a native Taiwanese deeply steeped
in Chinese historical and philosophical
sources, Chun-chieh Huang adds dimensions that are less emphasized in many
other perceptive books on contemporary
Taiwan. A prolific scholar of treatises on
Confucian thought, Huang believes that
Taiwan can bring much to contemporary Confucian thinking, since Taiwan
interprets the world through a lens of
contemporary and vibrant democracy—
as opposed to China’s legacy of the
Cultural Revolution and party control.
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In fact, he asserts that Taiwan can help
lead China’s Confucian revival as the
gem in the crown of Confucian thinking.
The book is divided into approximately
equal sections of retrospect and prospect, indicating the relative importance
that the author gives to understanding
the past as a foundation for understanding the present and the future. Before
Huang explores the individual and social
psychology of what it means to be a
“New Taiwanese,” he reviews the underlying nostalgia that almost all ethnically
Chinese people, including those resident
on Taiwan, have for cultural China.
This is a powerful shared emotion that
has ramifications for contemporary
cross-strait politics. Colonized by the
Japanese between 1895 and 1945, the
Taiwanese suffered second-class Chinese
citizenship and were labeled spies and
collaborators by their ethnically similar
mainland Chinese counterparts. Aside
from this broad-based cultural discrimination, the millions of Taiwanese were
then also repressed politically on the
island by the million or so Nationalists
who came to Taiwan after World War
II, first to set up a provincial government to replace the Japanese occupying
government, then to set up the Republic of China Nationalist government
at the end of the Chinese civil war.
The book recaps key eras in Taiwan’s
history, including the populating of the
island by Haklo from Fujian Province,
Hakka from Guangdong Province, the
Dutch (1624–61), Koxinga and the Ming
loyalists (1661–83), the Qing (1683–
1895), and the Japanese (1895–1945).
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Huang points out that the Chinese are
“Homo historicus” most clearly, and
that all ways forward must take into
account the patterns and details of the
past when considering the future.
According to Huang, Taiwan’s path
forward in cross-strait relations lies
between those extremes of citizens who
in 2013 favored quick integration (3
percent) and those who favored quick
independence (7.2 percent). He recommends a necessary long-term steady
dialogue examining and reconciling the
mutual histories of Taiwan and mainland China. That is to say, Huang is not a
proponent of maintaining the status quo
but seeks a Confucian “middle way”:
carefully and compassionately forging
an increasing reconciliation over time.
Using a metaphor from literature, he
posits that Taiwan is an orphan trying
to reconcile with its parent. The pathos
of the scenario is lessening because the
orphan has had great success, but nevertheless there is a core of Chinese identity
that still remains to be reconciled with
the ever-emerging Taiwanese identity.
Although, as noted, Huang is a native
observer of the Taiwanese scene, the
book is gracefully written in fluid, clear
English. It is useful as core reading for
undergraduate and graduate courses on
Taiwan, as well as for readers seeking
to deepen their knowledge of East Asia.
It also provides context that should be
considered when thinking about U.S.
policy in the Asia-Pacific region.
GRANT F. RHODE
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